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Trust Building Among Strangers
Abstract
The trust-building process is basic to social science. We investigate it in a laboratory setting using a novel
multistage trust game where social gains are achieved if players trust each other in each stage. In each
stage, also, players have an opportunity to appropriate these gains or be trustworthy by sharing them.
Players are strangers because they do not know the identity of others and they will not play them again.
Thus, there is no prospect of future interaction to induce trusting behavior, and we study the trust-building
process where there is little scope for social relations and networks.
Standard game theory, which assumes all players are opportunistic and untrustworthy and thus should
have zero trust for others, is used to construct a null hypothesis. We test whether people are trusting or
trustworthy and examine how inferring the intentions of those who trust affects trustworthiness. We also
investigate the effect of stake on trust, and study the evolution of trust.
Results show subjects exhibit some degree of trusting behavior, although a majority of them are not
trustworthy and claim the entire social gain. Players are more reluctant to trust in later stages than in
earlier ones and are more trustworthy if they are certain of the trustee’s intention. Surprisingly, subjects
are more trusting and trustworthy when the stake size increases. Finally, we find the subpopulation that
invests in initiating the trust-building process modifies its trusting behavior based on the relative fitness
of trust.
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TRUST BUILDING AMONG STRANGERS
Abstract

The trust building process is basic to social science. We investigate it in a laboratory setting
using a novel multi-stage trust game where social gains are achieved if players trust each other in
each stage. And in each stage, players have an opportunity to appropriate these gains or be
trustworthy by sharing them. Players are strangers because they do not know the identity of
others and they will not play them again in the future. Thus there is no prospect of future
interaction to induce trusting behavior. So, we study the trust building process where there is
little scope for social relations and networks.
Standard game theory, which assumes all players are opportunistic, untrustworthy, and
should have zero trust for others is used to construct a null hypothesis. We test whether people
are trusting or trustworthy and examine how inferring the intentions of those who trust affects
trustworthiness. We also investigate the effect of stake on trust, and study the evolution of trust.
Results show subjects exhibit some degree of trusting behavior though a majority of them
are not trustworthy and claim the entire social gain. Players are more reluctant to trust in later
stages than in earlier ones and are more trustworthy if they are certain of the trustee’s intention.
Surprisingly, subjects are more trusting and trustworthy when the stake size increases. Finally,
we find the sub-population who invests in initiating the trust building process modifies its
trusting behavior based on the relative fitness of trust.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Graham Greene aptly captured the centrality of trust to social relations when he wrote, "It
is impossible to go through life without trust: that is to be imprisoned in the worst cell of all,
oneself” (1943). Trust is one of a handful of concepts to transcend territorial barriers of social
disciplines; sociologists, anthropologists, economists, and psychologists study it. The social
sciences view trust as an emergent process fundamental in social interaction and market
efficiency (Creed & Miles, 1994; Etzioni, 1988). Without trust, opportunism rules and social
exchange is costly. Despite the costs of trusting when others are untrustworthy, establishing trust
can greatly benefit those involved (Axelrod, 1984). Some psychologists claim trust is the
hallmark of social adjustment (Gurtman, 1992; Erickson, 1963) and without it neuroses prevail.
Sociologists generally believe in producing trust, social relations and obligation are more
important than morality, contracts, or institutions (Granovetter, 1985; Shapiro, 1987; Uzzi,
1996). Most economists view trust rationally and posit people only trust when it pays to do so
(Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995).
Arguably, trust delivers its greatest social value as a linchpin to low-cost cooperative
behavior. It holds immense strategic value for any size group or organization. Monitoring and
incentives can motivate cooperative behavior, but at a higher cost. Organizational researchers
theorize and empirically show trust reduces managerial monitoring, decreases coordination costs,
and increases individual effort.

(Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; McAllister, 1995; Chiles &

McMackin, 1996, Uzzi, 1996). Trust often results in social gains, prompting some to suggest it
leads to prosperity in society (Fukuyama, 1995).
Like religion, trust requires a leap of faith. As Bradach and Eccles (1989) note, [The
faith to believe] “where opportunism might be rationally expected, trust prevails.” Some social
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biologists believe humans are genetically programmed not to trust or be trustworthy except for
kin (Wright, 1995). This is echoed by a dominant assumption in game theoretic equilibrium
analysis of self-interested and not trustworthy individuals (Myerson, 1991). Clearly, if people
trust and others are not trustworthy, they exact a heavy toll from the trusting. Consequently, the
existence of trusting and trustworthy behaviors is problematic.
Though problematic, we observe trusting and trustworthy behavior in others: A colleague
who borrows a book and returns it. Or, a pedestrian crosses the street in the face of oncoming
traffic because of a “stop sign”. Neoclassical economists use institutional mechanisms (Alchian
and Demsetz, 1973; Williamson, 1975; Rosen, 1982) to help explain trusting and trustworthy
behavior by self-interested people within the classical framework of utility maximization. They
rationalize that mechanisms such as explicit contracts, incentive schemes, and hierarchical
authority can induce individual behavior consistent with trust and trustworthiness. In this world,
trust is used not to explain behavior, but to label it (Craswell, 1993).1 To trust or not is purely
calculative; institutional mechanisms help individuals act as if they do trust, usually because
these mechanisms increase the costs of opportunistic behavior. As Granovetter (1985) aptly
notes, such mechanisms do not produce trust but are functional substitutes for it.
On the other hand, Granovetter (1985) posits that concrete personal relations are an
important determinant of trusting behavior.

This so-called “embeddedness” argument

emphasizes the role of social networks and reputation arising from interpersonal contacts. The
higher the embeddedness of the social relation, the more likely (on average), trust is extended,
and returned.

Granovetter suggests embeddedness is a necessary (though not sufficient)

condition for generating trusting behavior. General population-level reputation is significantly
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Malhotra and Murnighan (2000) report an interesting study to show that contracts make development of trust
difficult or block preexisting trust.
2

less important than individualized reputations generated by direct prior contacts, because direct
contacts provide more reliable information of others’ intentions. Granovetter states (p. 506) the
inclusion of such relations in the trust decision does not call for the abandonment of a rational
decision-making process. Instead, the degree of embeddedness should be factored into such
models, for example, as with a matching protocol (e.g., Ellison, 1993).
In this paper, we create an experimental setting where there is minimal scope for social
embeddedness. In our experiments, subjects interact anonymously and only play each other
once. Contracting is not possible, and in fact, subjects never find out with whom they play the
trust game.2 The novel game has additional desirable features. It allows us to untangle trusting
and trustworthy behavior; it has multiple stages, which allow subjects to detect the intention of
others; and mutual trusting behavior leads to sizable social gains. Delineating trusting from
trustworthy behavior is important because they are fundamentally different, and most previous
research on Prisoners’ dilemma entangles the two. The ability to detect intention of others allows
us to study an important construct: “pseudo trust”, which has not been investigated much in prior
studies. Pseudo trust occurs when one trusts and gives up property rights in early stages of the
game in order to regain larger ones in the later stages. This pseudo trust is to be differentiated
from the trusting behavior in later stages where there is no chance to regain property rights.
This paper aims to answer five basic research questions.

First, can anonymous

interactions (e.g., like exchanges between participants of e-bay auctions) generate trust and
trustworthy behavior? Our experimental design allows us to quantify the extent to which these
behaviors exist in our population. Second, how does the potential of future social gains influence
current trusting behavior? This potential varies across the stages of our trust game. Third, does
2

We use student subjects. It is possible that some students may know each other prior to the experiment. Thus, they
are strictly not strangers. We define strangers here to mean people who engage in anonymous and one-shot
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better knowledge of others’ trusting behavior make people more trustworthy? Within our game,
the uncertainty of intent of trusting players is high in early stages and low in later stages. Fourth,
is trusting behavior dependent on stake size? In three sessions, we increase the stake size tenfold
to see whether this increase affects trusting behavior. The dramatic increase in stake size allows
us to remove any concerns on whether subjects are sufficiently motivated and to test whether
stake size increases the extent of rational behavior. Fifth, do evolutionary paths of trust building
differ across sub-populations? Specifically, do the trust dynamics of the sub-population who
invests and initiates the trust building process differ from the one with the first decision rights to
terminate the process? We answer the above five questions by collecting data in three different
countries: US, Singapore, and China. This cross-cultural data collection effort helps to check for
robustness of the basic results and increase external validity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our trust building game.
Section 3 develops hypotheses using theories of trusting and trustworthy behavior from
sociology, economics, and psychology. Experimental design is presented in Section 4 and
results in Section 5.

Section 6 discusses the methodological issues, explores theoretical

implications of results, and suggests future research directions.

2. A TRUST BUILDING GAME
Our trust building game is shown in FIGURE 1.3 The game consists of 4 decision stages,
and is played between two players; one designated as “RED”, the other as “BLUE”. Akin to the

interaction.
3
While our trust building game looks like the centipede game (see Rosenthal, 1982; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992),
there is an important difference. In our game, the player can choose to be either trustworthy or not while in the
centipede game, players are forced to be not trustworthy.
4

real world, individual property rights are voluntarily given up in exchange for potential social
gain.
RED moves first. She can either “trust” BLUE and pass, or choose not to trust and select
down. If down is chosen, RED exercises her property rights and unilaterally decides how to split
the payoff of 4 (rewarding herself with 4a (0 < a < 1), while BLUE receives 4(1-a)), and the
game is over. If RED trusts, she passes, thereby giving up her property rights in hopes of sharing
future social gains. Social gains occur because the payoff doubles, though BLUE now owns the
property rights. That is, BLUE must now make a similar decision of whether to trust or not. If
BLUE trusts in decision stage 2, he passes. If BLUE does not trust, he takes and splits the payoff
so he receives 8 b (0 < b < 1) and RED receives a payoff of 8 (1-b). Similar to Glaeser et al.
(2000), we measure BLUE’s level of trustworthiness by the amount returned to RED. The higher
the returned amount, the more trustworthy is BLUE. The game is over if BLUE does not trust.
If BLUE trusts, and passes, we again double social gain to 16 in stage 3.
Then RED again must decide to trust or not. If RED does not trust, she takes, and must
decide whether to be trustworthy. Again, RED’s level of trustworthiness is measured by the
amount she returns to BLUE. If RED trusts, she passes to BLUE and the payoff doubles to 32.
In Stage 4, BLUE can only choose his level of trustworthiness.
In sum, we measure the degree of trusting behavior by the proportion of “passes” in
stages 1-3. We denote these proportions by x, y, and z respectively. The degree of
trustworthiness at each stage is represented by the proportions a, b, c, and d respectively.4
4

We implicitly assume the measure of trustworthiness is stage–independent. That is, b=0.6 and c = 0.6 represent
equivalent trustworthiness behaviors in stages 2 and 3. An alternative view could allow trustworthiness measures to
be stage-dependent. For example, RED in stage 3 may feel she is partly responsible for the larger payoff of 16 by
passing to BLUE in stage 1 and therefore is entitled to a larger proportion of the payoff. Hence, the level of
trustworthiness in stage 2 and 3 could be equivalent even if c > b. This latter view suggests that players will take
more for themselves in later stages for the same degree of trustworthiness. Thus, our proportions c and d provide a
lower bound for the degree of trustworthiness in stage 3 and 4. We find no evidence to support a stage-dependent
5

The game has several desirable features for examining the trust-building process. Unlike
some previous trust games (e.g. Bolle, 1995, Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe, 1998), our game
allows an individual to exhibit both trusting and trustworthy behavior. Subject decisions in each
stage consist of two components – strategy choice (to trust or not)5 and payoff choice (to be
trustworthy or not). Strategy choice determines whether a subject trusts (pass) or not (take).
Payoff choice determines whether the subject is trustworthy.6 Hence, one can be trusting but not
trustworthy.
Second, our trust game allows subjects to reveal their trustworthiness. Previous games
force subjects to choose between two payoff choices, which might not coincide with their most
preferred choice (for example in McKelvey and Palfrey 1992, subjects are forced to claim 80%
of the property rights. The same thing can be said about most studies of repeated prisoner’s
dilemma). So subjects may choose the better of two evils. Because subjects in our game can
divide the social gain in any way, they choose their most preferred level of trustworthiness.
With the multi-stage design, we can study how future social gains might influence the
trust building process. For example, if higher future social gains induce more trusting behavior,
we will see more passes in earlier decision stages. The design also allows us to test processbased trust, a widely identified trust process in sociological work (Zucker, 1986), while
controlling for institutional and person-based trust.
Our game shares similarities with other trust games – it is a two-person game and trusting
view because players do not seem sensitive to history within a game round (to be discussed in Section 5).
5
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) suggest one can cooperate but not trust, for the use of external mechanisms
can compel others to cooperate. For example, a team leader can punish those who won’t cooperate. Members may
not trust each other, but they prefer cooperation to the punishment for non-cooperation. No external mechanisms or
authorities enforce punishment in our design. To trust or not is solely an individual’s decision.
6
Strictly speaking, RED’s payoff choice in the first stage is not an indication of her trustworthy behavior because
she is endowed with the payoff, and it is not a consequence of social gain from trust. Also, BLUE’s strategy choice
in stage 4 is not an indication of trust because property rights are last exchanged in stage 3. We discuss this further
in Section 3.2. Because RED knows BLUE will not give back control of property rights, RED is clearly hoping to
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results in social gains. It also differs from other games in several important ways. For example,
our trust game is different from a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with an option to exit (PDO). In
our game, “trusting” at each stage means giving up the property rights – the truster has no control
over the payoff realization if the trustee chooses to end the game at the next stage. In the PDO
game, choosing to play does not mean the trustee has no influence over the expected payoffs. A
player who chooses to play the game or “trust” can still guarantee herself a nonnegative payoff
by choosing defection (as in Orbell and Dawes 1991; 1993). Second, our game gives those who
are trustworthy a complete freedom to divide the property rights as he wishes. The outcomes of
the PDO game are determined by the experimenter, not subjects7.
Similarly, there are other trust games closely related to ours (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe, 1995, Bolle, 1995; Glaeser, et al., 2000). These dictator-type trust games also give
trustees complete control in division of social welfare. However they are single-staged. The
trustee (the dictator) is never asked to relinquish control once given to her. Consequently, they
can only study initial stages of the trust building process.

3. HYPOTHESES
3.1 RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL UNCERTAINTY
A standard assumption in game-theoretic equilibrium analysis is that individuals are rational
(they are self-interested and monetary maximizing). Consequently, they cannot be entrusted
with property rights if there is no chance for penalizing untrustworthy behavior (either through
get a “fair split” of the social gains. She must believe that BLUE is trustworthy.
7
This “selective play” paradigm literature shows that social welfare increases when subjects have a freedom to
choose between playing or not playing a particular Prisoner’s Dilemma game. These increases occur because
intending cooperators are more likely to enter such games relative to intending defectors, resulting in a better chance
of cooperative outcomes. Consequently, the welfare of intending cooperators is higher than that of intending
defectors (Orbell, Schwartz-Shea and Simmons, 1984; Orbell and Dawes, 1991; 1993; Morikawa, Orbell and Runde,
1995; Hayashi and Yamagishi, 1998).
7

formal institutional mechanisms or informal sanctions of social relations). This game-theoretic
reasoning is as follows: If stage 4 is reached in our game, a rational BLUE player will keep the
property entrusted to him for himself and take 32 (i.e., d = 1). A rational RED player, knowing
this, will neither trust BLUE nor be trustworthy. Hence, she will take the entire payoff of 16 in
stage 3. Anticipating this action of RED in stage 3, a rational BLUE player exhibits this
behavior in Stage 2, takes 8, and leaves nothing for RED. Completing this backward induction
argument, the rational RED player takes 4 in the first stage. Hence all players are neither
trusting nor trustworthy.
Sociologists also believe little trust will develop where social uncertainty is high, there is
little commitment to relations, and social embeddedness is insignificant. Kollock (1994) and
Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe (1998) indicate social uncertainty exists when 1) the trustee has an
incentive to impose harm or cost on the truster 2) the truster is uncertain about whether the
trustee will actually impose this harm or cost. Our design imposes high levels of social
uncertainty on subjects by decreasing the probability of committed relations. Committed
relations reduce social uncertainty in two ways: 1) committed partners accumulate information
about each other (i.e., mutual monitoring) and 2) reciprocity is possible (i.e., mutual hostages or
Tit-For-Tat) (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Our experimental design makes any degree of
commitment in a relation almost impossible. In fact, it provides an estimate of the degree of
trusting behavior in a population of strangers where social embeddedness is insignificant.
Subjects play against each other at most once (i.e., they are strangers), each subject only assumes
the role of either a RED or BLUE player, RED and BLUE players are in different rooms, and
players are not told with whom they are matched. Consequently, we expect subjects to have a
high level of social uncertainty. In our experiments, there is neither a way to reveal the identity
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nor a disincentive to penalize untrustworthy individuals. The act of being untrustworthy is
known only to the untrustworthy subject and the one whose trust was betrayed. And, the two
will never meet again in the future. So there are no formal or informal mechanisms available to
punish an untrustworthy player. The lack of monitoring and penalty increases the probability of
opportunism. Consequently, we expect less trustworthy behavior.
The standard theories in economics and sociology lead to the predictions that people will
exhibit neither trusting nor trustworthy behavior. Consequently, we have following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: Proportions b = c =d =1. That is, individuals are not trustworthy (i.e., they are
opportunistic).
Hypothesis 1b: Proportions x = y = z = 0. That is, individuals exhibit zero trust; they do not give
up property rights.

Since there is an increasing evidence to suggest that humans are boundedly rational and care
about fairness (see Camerer, 2003 for an excellent review), the above hypotheses serve as our
baseline hypotheses. They allow us to compare our results with those reported in the literature
and quantify the degree of deviation from the standard rational hypotheses.

3.2 INFORMED RECIPROCITY
There is a subtle difference between trusting behaviors in the first two stages and the third. A
BLUE player who receives the property rights from a RED player in stage 3 can infer
unambiguously the intention of RED. By passing, RED clearly indicates her belief of the
BLUE’s trustworthiness, for the only decision facing BLUE is one of trustworthiness. The same
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thing cannot be said for trusting behavior in stage 1 or 2. We cannot unambiguously infer
players who relinquish their property rights in these earlier stages believe others are trustworthy.
Players, who give up their property rights in stages 1 and 2, have the opportunity to regain future
larger property rights. Consequently, there is greater social uncertainty in the earlier stages for
the trustee. Do subjects give up property rights because they believe others are trustworthy, or
for cultivating pseudo trust? Pseudo trust occurs when one trusts to increase property rights for
the possibility of claiming them in the later stages. Because players are better informed about
intentions of trusting subjects in stage 3 relative to stages 1 and 2, we expect a greater level of
trustworthiness in stage 4. Since BLUE can unambiguously detect and interpret the intention of
RED in stage 3, he can selectively be more trustworthy to those who trust not for own but for
social gain. This informed reciprocity is characterized as “translucent” (Gauthier, 1986; Orbell
and Dawes, 1991), which is the degree to which one can recognize another’s intention.
Consequently, individuals who are more certain of the intentions of others’ trusting behaviors are
more trustworthy. That is,
Hypothesis 2: Proportion d < (b + c)/2.
3.3 THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF TRUST
In each stage of the trust building game, those who trust must give up property rights in
exchange for potential social gain. We define trust’s potential value as the difference between the
expected future return from trusting and the property rights currently held. The expected future
return at any stage is computed given the percentages of passing and taking and the mean
percentage of property rights claimed in future stages. Necessarily, the expected return for
earlier stages is higher than for later ones. Hence, we expect to see less trusting behavior in later
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stages of the game than earlier ones. For example, a RED player in stage 1 can take and receive
a payoff of 4, but is losing the opportunity to share a potential future payoff of 32. In stage 3,
this same player can take and realize a gain of 16, versus the opportunity to share a future payoff
of 32. Consequently, individuals are less trusting as the potential value of trust decreases.

Hypothesis 3: Proportion x > y > z.
3.4 HIGH-STAKE TRUST BUILDING
While relatively little research shows how the magnitude of payoffs affects trusting behavior –
though stories of soldiers who sacrifice themselves to save comrades are as old as war itself
(Holmes, 1985) – the effect of financial incentives on experimental subject behavior has attracted
substantial attention among social scientists. For some reviews see Smith and Walker (1993),
Bonner et al., (1996), Hertwig and Ortmann (1998), Jenkins, et al. (1998) and Camerer and
Hogarth (1999). While these authors examine hundreds of experiments, no definitive answer
arises from them, though there is consensus on general trends. The majority of reviews find
increased financial incentives have no significant impact on mean subject behavior, though they
do reduce the variance across choices (Smith and Walker, 1993; Bonner et al., 1996; Camerer
and Hogarth, 1999).

Hertwig and Ortmann (1998) find incentives slightly affect behavior

(though most often when increased from zero). Jenkins et al. (1998) find the strongest link
between incentives and performance, though most of the studies they review are one-person
output tasks (e.g., coding) that measure performance on a purely quantitative scale.
Another consensual finding is that incentives matter more in non-strategic than in
strategic tasks. A strategic task is one where a subject’s payoff depends on her actions and those
of others.

Non-strategic ones examine one-person decisions like the recalling of items,
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predicting future states, or output per time period. For example, Camerer and Hogarth (1999),
report the following. They categorize fifty-eight studies as whether an increase in financial
incentives did or did not significantly change mean performance. In thirty-one (53.4%) studies,
they did. Of these thirty-one studies, seven (22.5%) were strategic experiments and twenty-four
were non-strategic. In contrast, of the twenty-seven studies where mean performance did not
change, twenty (74.1%) were strategic. Furthermore, if we categorize the 34 strategic studies
into bargaining [trust building] or non-bargaining (e.g., signaling, auctions, tournaments) games,
all 9 bargaining games fall into the category of increased incentives having no effect on mean
performance. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) state, “… results in Table 1 [summarizing the above
results we discuss] suggest little reason to think the effects of very large incentives will be
substantial.” They conclude this finding is applicable to strategic decisions especially in
bargaining and auctions. Consequently, we hypothesize the level of trust is not dependent on
stake size.

Hypothesis 4: The level of trust does not depend on the stake size. Proportions x, y, and z are not
functions of stake size.
3.5 POPULATION LEARNING AND THE EMERGENCE OF TRUST
The logic behind hypothesis 1 is grounded in full rationality of players. Recent research in
economics increasingly suggests players are boundedly rational with adaptive expectations
(Simon, 1957, Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Camerer and Ho, 1999; Camerer, Ho, and Chong,
2002). These models assume subjects’ actions are path dependent and self-correcting. Subjects
stick to strategies, which worked well in the past, or experiment with previously unchosen
strategies likely to improve performance. Alternatively, one can view trust building in an
evolutionary perspective. For instance, Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1998) suggest that their
subjects exhibited reciprocity even in single-shot games (counter to rational hypothesis) because
12

humans have evolved mental algorithms for identifying and punishing cheaters in social
exchange. In evolutionary dynamics terms, subjects adjust their behavior by mimicking the
person that is the most successful or “fittest.” Thus, future trusting behavior depends on its
current success or relative fitness. The higher the number of trusting and trustworthy individuals
in the population, the more likely trusting and trustworthy behavior increases both the payoffs of
the collective and individuals. We expect trusting behavior in the population increases as its
expected value (or fitness) increases. While our focus is on the evolution dynamics of group
behavior, other studies suggest group dynamics can be derived from individual learning models
in which subjects modify their propensity of choosing a strategy based on its performance (see
for example Friedman, 1991; Borgers and Sarin, 1997).

Hypothesis 5: The emergence of trust in a population is governed by evolution dynamics. There
is more trust in the population if trust has a higher relative fitness.
4. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
A total of 386 subjects participated in the experiment. Subjects were recruited from
undergraduate courses at National University of Singapore in Singapore (n=106), University of
Pennsylvania in the United States (n=100), and from Beijing University in the People’s Republic
of China (n=180).
A typical experimental session consisted of twenty subjects who met in a room at a
specified time. As they entered the room, they chose a bingo ball from a cage containing 20
balls numbered 1-20 (a ball chosen was not replaced).8 The number on the ball represented his
subject number.

8

Then the instructions (Appendix I) were publicly read. After questions,

Two sessions in Singapore used 52 and 54 subjects and required a larger number of bingo balls.
13

“BLUE” subjects (those with odd subject numbers) were asked to go to another room. “RED”
subjects remained in the room. Subjects in each room were positioned so no subject could see
the worksheet of another.
Our multi-stage trust building game consisted of four stages. RED subjects made choices
in Stage 1 and 3 and BLUE subjects in Stage 2 and 4. Although the game could end in any stage
(when subjects chose “take”), subjects recorded their choices in both stages. We asked subjects
to record their contingent strategy for two reasons. First, we reduced the data collection time and
hence the potential for boredom. Second, contingent strategies help us understand subject
behavior in all stages even though the actual game might end earlier.9
Each session consisted of ten rounds and lasted for about one hour. In each round a
BLUE subject was paired with a RED subject (this was her pair member). Subject choices were
privately made and recorded by an administrator in the room. After all subjects in both rooms
made their decisions, the two administrators met outside the rooms and recorded all choices.
They then went back to their respective rooms, privately informed each subject of the choices of
the pair member and the generated payoff. The administrator then announced the end of that
round and the beginning of the next round. Each BLUE subject was paired with a RED subject
only once, so each subject had a new partner in each round. This procedure of matching subjects
rules out any possibility of a shadow of the future across rounds.10 A RED player clearly cannot
influence the action of another RED player because they never interact with each other. Also,
RED cannot influence a BLUE player because she only plays with BLUE once and BLUE
players never play against each other. A similar line of reasoning applies to BLUE players. This
9

Consequently, in Figure 2, the total choice count in stage 3 is 1178 and in stage 4 is 662.

10

This matching protocol rules out even the triadic effects. That is, player A may want to be nice to player B
because player B will be playing player C whom player A will play in the future. Clearly this is not possible in our
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matching method however does not rule out a shadow of the future across stages within a game
round.11 After 10 rounds subjects add up their points from each round, and multiply this by a
conversion rate which transforms the points into a monetary payoff. The subjects were explicitly
told they would be paid in cash after the experiment, so they understood earnings were a function
of decision choices.12
Subjects seemed to understand the instructions and the payoff associated with each of
their actions. This was evidenced in two ways. First, after the experiment and during the
debriefing, subjects’ comments suggested that they did not have trouble writing down contingent
strategies (e.g., “Many of my choices in stage III or IV did not matter.”) and the matching
protocol (e.g., “I could not build relationship with a person because we did not match with the
same person more than once.”) Second, almost 100% of the choices in Stage IV were Take (see
Figure 2), which is a dominant choice. This result indirectly suggests subjects did understand the
game.
We conducted over 16 experimental sessions, five in the US, nine in China, and two large
sessions in Singapore to check the robustness of our findings. Six China sessions were lowstake, 3 were high-stake.13 High-stake sessions had a tenfold increase in the conversion rate.
Because we collected data in different countries, we took the following precautionary controls.
Instructions in a country were written in its primary language – English in Singapore and the US
and Chinese in China. We used the reverse translation method to ensure Chinese instructions
design because players of the same color never play each other.
11
We believe our simultaneous social exchange protocol deters subjects from perceiving a shadow of the future
within a game round because subjects must submit a full contingent strategy without knowing the strategies of
others. As discussed in Section 5, we test this belief by running additional experiments using a sequential social
exchange protocol. In the sequential protocol, subjects choose after knowing the strategies of others in prior stages
within a game round. Since the results from the two exchange protocols are virtually identical, we conclude that
subjects did not perceive a shadow of the future within a game round.
12
As suggested by Kee and Knox (1970), such meaningful incentives allow subjects to clearly recognize the
dangers and rewards of extending trust.
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were equivalent to those in English. That is, an independent translator translated the instructions
from English into Chinese and another independent translator from Chinese back into English.
Then, one of the authors who is fluent in both Chinese and English checked both translations.
The conversion rate was chosen to normalize average payoff so that subjects were paid about
twice the minimal wage for the country. On average, US subjects earned US$11, Singapore
subjects earned about S$10, and Chinese subjects about 24 and 320 Yuan Renminbi in the lowstake and high-stake games respectively. This latter earning is approximately equivalent to twomonth wages for a blue-collar worker.

5. RESULTS
Altogether 386 subjects participated in the experiment (193 RED and 193 BLUE subjects). Each
subject made choices over 10 rounds. Figure 2 summarizes their choices in each of the four
decision stages. As you can see, trusting behavior monotonically declines across decision stages
while the degree of trustworthiness monotonically increases.

Recall we examine trusting

behavior in stages 1-3 and trustworthiness in stages 2-4. In each stage, there is a substantial
decline in the proportion of trusting choices. On the other hand, the degree of trustworthiness
increases marginally for stages 2-3 with a substantial increase in stage 4.
Seventy-two percent of the RED choices initiate trusting building in stage 1.
Correspondingly, 41% of the BLUE’s choices and 20% of the RED’s choices are of the trusting
nature in stage 2 and 3 respectively. In stages 2 and 3, those who did not trust were also not
trustworthy; they kept 95% and 94% of the property rights. Interestingly, in stage 4 only 78% of
the property rights were claimed.14 We formally test our hypotheses below.

13
14

Our research budget did not allow us to conduct high-stake sessions in Singapore and US.
Obviously, these percentages are generated only those who trusted in stage 2.
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We test whether subjects are trustworthy by examining the percentages of property rights
claimed by BLUE players in stage 2. We focus on the trustworthiness of BLUE subjects who
choose not to trust and immediately terminate the trusting building process. A more trustworthy
BLUE should return a higher entrusted property rights to RED. A fully opportunistic BLUE
takes 100% of the property rights. Table 1 reports the average proportion of property rights
claimed along with the 95% confidence interval. It clearly shows BLUE subjects are largely
opportunistic in stage 2. The average proportions claimed exceed 95% in all three countries.
Overall, these results support hypothesis 1a.
In spite of this lack of trustworthy behavior, we find some support for trusting behavior in
Table 1. We test hypothesis 1b by the percentage of RED subjects who initiate the trust building
process by choosing pass in stage 1. About 70% of RED subjects trust by giving up their
property rights in stage 1. For example, 73% of the Singaporean RED subjects chose pass in the
first stage. Clearly, a significant percentage of subjects initiate the trust building process. Thus,
we find no support for hypothesis 1b.
Hypothesis 2 examines the effect of behavioral translucency on trustworthy behavior. It
states trustworthiness is more likely when the intention of the trustee is less ambiguous. We test
this hypothesis by comparing trustworthy behaviors in stage 4 relative to earlier stages. A BLUE
subject in stage 4 is certain about the trusting intention of RED because there is no opportunity
for RED to regain property rights. The same cannot be said for earlier stages. For example, a
BLUE subject in stage 2 cannot be sure why a RED subject passes her property rights in stage 1.
She may pass selfishly so as to increase property rights for the possibility of claiming them in
stage 3 or she may pass for the collective social gain. In stage 4, there is no such uncertainty.
Table 2a shows the average proportions claimed are 95.85%, 93.96%, and 77.4% in
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stages 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Across the three countries, the 95% confidence intervals for stage
4 do not overlap with those in stages 2 or 3. In fact, in the first 5 rounds, the modal proportion
claimed in stage 4 is 50% (131 out of the 354 subjects who take in stage 4)15. Clearly, subjects
are more trustworthy in stage 4. Thus we find some support for hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 states trust increases with the difference in the expected return from trusting
and the size of property rights currently held. Since this difference decreases over stages, we
expect less trusting behavior in latter stages. Table 2b clearly supports this hypothesis. There is a
significant decrease in trusting behavior from stage 1 to stage 2, and from stage 2 to stage 3. This
is true across all countries. The average percentages of subjects trusting are 72%, 40% and 20%
in stages 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that stake size will not affect trusting behavior. Figure 4 shows
subject behavior in the three high-stake trust games. Comparing Figures 2 and 4, it is obvious
that subjects exhibit significant more trust in the high-stake games. For example, in stage 3, RED
subjects pass 80.3% as compared to 20.4% in low-stake games (a simple proportion test indicates
this difference is highly significant (p < 0.001)). This higher level of trust in stage 3 is also
matched by a higher level of trustworthiness in stage 4. For example, 167 out of 270 choices in
the high-stake games were d = 0.5 whereas only 197 out of 660 choices in the low-stake games
were d = 0.5 (i.e., divide the property rights evenly).
We examine hypothesis 5 by testing whether changes in subjects’ behaviors are
consistent with evolution dynamics. For each RED player in every round, there are three
possible trusting behaviors: 1) take in stage 1 (T), 2) pass in stage 1 and take in stage 3 (PT), or
3) pass in stage 1 and pass in stage 3 (PP). The fitness (or payoff) for T is 4. The fitness for PT

15

The number of subjects who chose a 50:50 split in stage 1,2, 3, and 4 across all 10 rounds were 11 (out of 453), 23
(out of 968), 38 (out of 938), and 197 (out of 660) respectively.
18

is the sum of two terms: 1) the percentage of “Take” in stage 2 times 8 (1-b) and 2) the
percentage of “Pass” in stage 2 times 16. For example, in Figure 3, the expected potential payoff
for PT in round 1 is 0.547*(1- 0.8838)*8 + 0.453*16 = 7.76. Similarly, the fitness for PP is a
sum of two terms: 1) the percentage of “Take” in stage 2 times 8 (1-b), and 2) the percentage of
“Pass” in stage 2 times the percentage of “Take” in stage 4 times 32(1-d). In Figure 3, this
becomes 0.547*8*(1-0.8838) + 0.453*1.00*32*(1-0.6767) = 5.20. These fitness measures are
given in Table 3. Hypothesis 5 suggests the expected use of a strategy in the next round depends
on its use in the current round and increases with its current fitness relative to the fitness of other
strategies. Mathematically, we model the proportion of strategy j in round t to be:

Pj (t ) = αPj (t − 1) + (1 − α )

e

βEV j ( t −1)

∑eβ

EVk ( t −1)

K

The model suggests the proportion of subjects choosing strategy j in a round is a function
of the proportion of subjects choosing the same strategy in the previous round and the fitness of
strategy j in the previous round relative to other strategies. α > 0 implies subjects show a
tendency to repeat their previous choice regardless of the fitness from their previously chosen
strategies. This could be inertia or due to insufficient experimentation. β >0 suggests subjects are
more likely to pick a strategy j if they receive a higher fitness from the strategy relative to others.
That is, trusting behavior is driven by fitness (i.e., subjects modify their behavior in response to
fitness changes if β >0). Such behavior can be interpreted as subjects either imitating a more
successful other or as merely selecting a more successful action with a higher probability
regardless of whether it was chosen or not in the current round (Camerer and Ho, 1999).
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We test hypothesis 5 by examining whether α and β are significantly greater than zero.
We run a nonlinear regression using data from Table 3 and report the results in Table 4. As
shown, both RED and BLUE players tend to repeat their previously chosen strategies
(α = 0.5262 (RED), p < 0.0001; α = 0.8209 (BLUE), p < 0.0001). In addition, results suggest
RED players are sensitive to the relative fitness of trust (β = 0.2794, p < 0.0001). They trust if
rewarded for the trust. However, we do not observe similar calculative behavior for BLUE
players. Overall, these results suggest that both RED and BLUE exhibit status-quo bias and only
RED seems to be sensitive to payoffs and engage in imitative behavior.
The behavioral difference in RED and BLUE players is interesting. We note that RED
players are the initiator of the trust building process and own the original property rights of 4.
BLUE players, on the other hand, do not explicitly invest in the trust building process. Hence,
RED players may expect a higher payoff from the trust building process than the BLUE players.
Consequently, they care more about the expected payoff than BLUE players.
Our results suggest the two sub-populations follow a different evolutionary trust building
path. The evolutionary path of RED is governed by the relative fitness of trust while that of
BLUE is not. We conjecture this is due to RED being endowed with an initial payoff of 4 before
the trust-building process begins and hence this is a natural reference point to compare her actual
payoff with. Consequently they are likely to be more conscious of the actual payoff. Conversely,
BLUE does not have this initial endowment. And, BLUE appears to have a commitment to
reward a trusting RED when he is certain of her trusting intention. Alternatively, one may
interpret that RED has more power than BLUE in the sense that she can choose not to initiate the
trust process without any inputs from BLUE. This difference in perceived power can cause her to
be more sensitive to actual payoffs.
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6. DISCUSSION

This research is designed to examine trust building in communities with anonymous exchanges.
We define an anonymous exchange as one in which individuals interact with each other only
once and do not know the identity of their partners. We disentangle trusting and trustworthiness
behaviors using a novel experimental design. We find players in the population are not
trustworthy when they are uncertain about others’ trusting intentions. Interestingly, even with a
total lack of formal mechanisms, and little (if any) informal sanctions due to the minimum scope
of social relations, we find evidence of trusting behavior. Stake size appears to increase both
trusting and trustworthy behaviors. Sub-populations however may follow different evolutionary
paths of trusting behaviors. Some may trust based on its relative fitness and others may not.
Results suggest sub-populations with the decision rights to initiate the trust building and those
who hold the first rights to continue the process follow different evolutionary paths.

6.1 Methodological Issues

The experimental design allows us to differentiate and examine trust and trustworthiness
through the choice set of subjects. Choices consist of two components – strategy (trust or not)
and division of social gains (trustworthiness). Many previous studies fail to distinguish between
these components of the trust process because they test trust using a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma design (Heckathorn,1988).

Results suggest there is value in separating these

components since we do see divergence in behavior. For example, in the initial stage of our

21

game there is significantly more trusting behavior than trustworthiness. We find a decrease in
trusting behavior as the potential value of trust drops.
Our design uses a social exchange protocol in which players must decide what to do
without knowing the choices of others (i.e., contingent strategy). Game theory predicts that using
this design should not alter the strategy choices of subjects. However, previous research in
prisoner’s dilemma games suggests that subjects are more likely to cooperate if they know the
other is willing to cooperate (Kiyonari et. al (in press); McCabe, Smith and LePore, 2000). If
this finding generalizes to our trust game then we should see more trust building behavior when
subjects are provided with the choices of others in previous stages.
We test this empirically.16 We ran two additional 20-subject experiments in the United
States using a sequential exchange protocol to determine whether social exchange protocol has
an impact on trusting building. That is, subjects were not asked for contingent strategies. In each
stage, they were told the choice of their pair member in the previous stage. For example, if RED
passed in Stage 1, BLUE was told this and then asked what they wanted to do in Stage 2. If
BLUE passed in Stage 2, we went back to RED and asked what she wanted to do in Stage 3, and
so on. Figure 5 reports the results of these experiments. If we compare Figure 5 with Figure 2,
we see that subject behaviors are alike. At each of the four stages, the degree of exhibited trust
and trustworthiness is very similar. It is as if subjects can predict the behavior of others without
knowing their action choices.

6.2 Theoretical Implications
Prior explanations for trust-building generally revolve around the promise of future

16

In addition to testing behaviors in different exchange protocols, this manipulation provides an indirect test of
whether subjects can predict others’ intentions. Our results suggest they can in this setting.
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interactions. Alexrod (1984) claims this shadow of the future helps to develop trust. Our
experiment design allows us to test this formally. There is no shadow of the future; subjects are
told they will not interact with one another for more than one round.17 Verbal or non-verbal cues
are not possible because subjects do not play face-to-face and play is anonymous. Yet, we see a
significant level of trust and non-negligible level of trustworthiness develop.
We conjecture the following. In our experimental setup, trusting may lead to higher
payoffs, so it is not surprising to see people trust. In fact people seem to trust more when the
likelihood of a greater payoff is higher. For example, RED subjects who trust in stage 1 have a
higher probability of receiving a payoff greater than the non-trusting one of 4 relative to that of
the trusting RED subjects in stage 3 receiving a payoff greater than the non-trusting one of 16.
Hence it is the promise of social gain that drives this trusting building process.
It is however more difficult to rationalize the significant level of trustworthiness behavior
in the last stage. As discussed before, subjects at stage 4 exhibit the greatest level of
trustworthiness because they are certain about the trusting intention of others. Some have
suggested that our trust game can be interpreted as a multi-stage dictator game. Clearly, our
game at stage 4 is a single-stage dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Forsythe,
et. al, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996;
Malhotra and Murnighan, 2000).18 Thus it might be interesting to compare our results with those
17

We take steps to ensure that subjects believe in the instructions. For example, they are explicitly told that they
will only interact with one another once. Subjects are also told there are 10 RED subjects and 10 BLUE subjects in
each room so that we have the required number of subjects to match them with each other for each round. We also
have shown subjects our scoring sheet before the experiment which clearly shows the different pairings in each
round.
18
Kiyonari and Yamagishi (1997) devised an interesting variant of the dictator game in which the respondent has an
option whether or not to trust the proposer for a division. In their studies, the respondent could opt out for a sure
payoff, which is less than half of the proposer’s property rights. They found more than 80% of their subjects trusting
and the average division of the proposer was 42%. Compared to our results from stage 3 and 4, these were
significantly higher trusting and trustworthiness behaviors. One reviewer suggests that this difference could be due
to the fact that a truster’s payoff is totally dependent on a trustee’s action in their game whereas the same action
only accounts for one-tenth of a truster’s payoff in our design.
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from single-stage dictator games. Payments to the respondents (or in our case the RED subjects)
are often interpreted as altruistic behavior (Camerer, 2003). At stage 4 of our game, this
interpretation may not be appropriate because our stage 4 also contains trusting history from
prior stages and subjects may want to reward this past trusting behavior.
We compute the mean proportion of payment to respondents in three similar studies that
allow proposers to divide the property rights continuously from 0 to 100% (Forsythe, et. al,
1994; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996). The
mean payment to respondents is 17% and the modal response is 0% across 7 of the 9
experimental conditions.
Our mean proportion is 22.6%. This is higher than that from the above three dictator
game studies. We speculate that some BLUE subjects initially reward RED’s trusting behavior
because they are certain about their trusting intention. However, this effect wears off gradually
over time. This conjecture is supported by the fact that our modal response in rounds 1-5 was
50% whereas in rounds 6-10 it was 0%.19
Overall, our results suggest a significant number of subjects exhibit “pseudo trust” when
interacting anonymously. This pseudo trust is cultivated in order to harness a return in exchange
for the risk taken in giving up property rights. As long as everyone takes this risk, it benefits the
population because this pseudo trust increases social gain. This expectation becomes a selffulfilling prophecy or a population-level behavioral norm. For such a behavioral norm to
develop, it is crucial that each player has the opportunity to regain the increased property rights.
This is the case in the first 3 stages of the game. Consequently, players who want to stop trusting
are also not trustworthy. Hence, it is possible to have a population who exhibits “pseudo trust”,
19

In rounds 1-5, of the 354 observations of BLUE subjects passing in stage 2 and taking in stage 4, 131 times
(37.0%) they took 50% and 110 times (31.1%) they took 100%. In rounds 6-10, they took 50% 66 times (21.6%)
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but is not trustworthy.
To sustain the pseudo trust behavior of BLUE in stage 2, there must be a non-negligible
proportion of RED subjects who trust in stage 3. These RED subjects clearly trust for social
gains because they will not regain the property rights. Figure 2 shows about 20% of RED exhibit
this trusting behavior. The result that 20% of our population trust for social gain without any
formal enforcement mechanism or informal sanctions mirrors results of earlier studies. For
example, similar to the dictator-type games discussed above, Camerer and Weigelt (1988) find
about 17% of their subjects exhibit this type of trust. These findings suggest about 15-20% of the
subject population willingness to trust even in anonymous exchanges.
Our findings have implications for Granovetter’s theory of embeddedness (1985).
Granovetter suggests the network of social relations is an important determinant of trust between
individuals. Macy and Skvoretz (1998) measure the degree of embeddedness in social relations
by the percentage of interactions with neighbors (i.e., individuals with which a person has prior
contact). For example, if embeddedness equals .5, then half of future interactions are with
neighbors, and half with strangers. They examine trust-building in environments with degrees of
embeddedness between 1 and .5.

Using this measure, our experiment has a degree of

embeddedness of 0. Since each subject only interacts with another for a maximum of 1 round,
future interactions are always with strangers. Yet, despite the lack of embeddedness, we observe
trusting and some degree of trustworthy behavior.

6.3 Future Research
We observe subject trusting and trustworthy behaviors are similar across all three
countries in the early stages. For example, the proportion of trusting behavior in stage 1 is around
and 100% 177 times (58.0%) out of 306 times.
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70% in all three countries (see Table 1). Similarly, the proportion of property rights claimed in
stage 2 is around 95% in all three countries. Table 2a shows there is also little difference across
countries in trustworthiness in the later stages (except in stage 3 where the mean proportion
claimed by China subjects appears to be lower, though it is above 90%). Table 2b shows the
level of trust in the later stages is different across the three countries. In particular, China
subjects appear to exhibit a slightly higher level of trust than the other 2 countries in stages 2 and
3. Future research should investigate this difference more formally.
It is worth noting that Chinese subjects exhibited significantly more trusting and
trustworthy behaviors in high-stake games. Put differently, subject behaviors deviate more from
standard game theory predictions in these games. Future high-stake experiments in other
countries would help to examine the generalizability of this finding.
An interesting research route is to modify the exchange context to eliminate the use of a
credible signal by RED and a detection strategy by BLUE in stage 4. In its current form, the trust
relationship ends in stage 4 with certainty. If this exchange only ends probabilistically, the ability
of RED to send a credible signal and BLUE to detect the signal is considerably weakened. In this
modified design, we expect less trustworthiness in stage 4.
Our results on stake size suggest another route of future research -- why does stake size
increase the level of trust (c.f. McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992)? One possible explanation is that
stake size changes the nature of social interaction. Subjects may feel a greater sense of reliance
for each other in the high-stake games because they want to realize the huge increase in social
gains. The penalty for non-trusting behavior is more costly. Consequently, they are more
willingly to trust and reward trust. Such behavior can occur if subjects develop an initial
expectation for it, which later is confirmed by observed behavior (i.e., a self-fulfilling
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expectation).
Another path to pursue is to modify the rate of social gain (see for example McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1992). In our study, social gain doubles every time a subject exhibits trusting
behavior. What kind of trusting behavior might emerge if the rate of social gain is increasing in
the amount of trust developed? Such a pattern of social gain seems plausible and reflects a
greater efficiency among players. For example, the property rights could be 8, 24, 96 in Stage 2,
3, and 4 respectively.
Lastly, it may be interesting to extend this research is to manipulate social
embededness.20 We can easily do this by varying the number of times each pair of players
interact in each round and the probability of their rematch in the future rounds. In this study,
each pair of RED and BLUE players interact once in each round and their rematch probability is
zero in future rounds.

20

Ellison (1993) shows mathematically that the rate at which dynamic behaviors converge to the Pareto efficient
equilibrium in a coordination game depends on the structure of the interaction. A faster rate of convergence can be
achieved if the interaction is confined only to nearest neighbors compared to the interaction among strangers.
27
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APPENDIX I
NAME _____________________

SUBJECT NO. ______
INSTRUCTIONS

This is an experiment in decision-making. The instructions are simple; if you follow them
carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money which will
be paid to you in cash before you leave today. Different subjects may earn different amounts of
cash. What you earn today partly depends on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others,
and partly on chance.
There are 20 subjects in this room. Each subject has been randomly assigned a subject number.
When we finish reading these instructions, 10 subjects will be told to go to another room. When
this experiment begins, you will always be paired with a subject in the other room. You will
never play with a subject in your room. The experiment will consist of 10 decision rounds. In
these 10 decision rounds, you will be paired with each of the 10 subjects in the other room for 1
round. So you will always be paired with a subject in the other room, and you will never play
with any subject more than once.
It is important that you do not look at the decisions of others, and that you do not talk, laugh, or
exclaim aloud during the experiment. You will be warned if you violate this rule the first time.
If you violate this rule twice, you will be asked to leave, and you will not be paid. That is, your
earnings will be $0.
Experimental procedure
Subjects will be randomly assigned to one of two rooms. Subjects in this room will belong to the
"RED" group; subjects in the other room to the "BLUE" group. Whether you belong to the RED
or BLUE group will be determined as follows. An administrator will circulate among you with a
box containing numbered balls. As the administrator passes by, you select a ball from the box.
If the ball you select is an even number then you will be a member of the RED group, and you
will remain a RED member for the entire experiment. All RED members will go to the other
room. If the ball is an odd number, you are a member of the BLUE group, and you will remain a
BLUE member for the entire experiment. All BLUE members will remain in this room.
In this experiment you will play the following game. First, you will be randomly matched with a
subject of the opposite color. Hence a BLUE member will always be paired with a RED member
and vice versa. The following Figure shows how the game will work.

33

[SEE FIGURE 1]
RED moves first in Stage 1. If RED chooses "take" then the RED player can choose to take
some percentage (a) of 4 points. This percentage can range from 0% to 100%. The BLUE
player receives the difference (1 - a). For example, if the RED player chooses an a of 70%, the
RED player receives 2.8 points (70% X 4), and the BLUE player receives 1.2 points ((1 - .7) X
4). Or, if the RED player chooses an a of 20%, the RED player receives .8 points (20% X 4),
and the BLUE player 3.2 points ((1 - .2) X 4). If the RED player passes then the BLUE player
must choose between "pass" or "take". In Stage 2, the pool of points doubles. So the BLUE
player must choose to take some percentage (b) of 8 points. For example, if the BLUE player
chooses 90% then the BLUE player receives 7.2 points (90% X 8), and the RED player receives
.8 points ((1 - .9) X 8). If the BLUE player "passes" we move to Stage 3. At Stage 3, the pool of
points doubles again to 16 points, and the RED player must decide whether to "take" or "pass".
If the RED player "takes", the player must decide what percentage of 16 points she will keep,
and what percentage to give to the BLUE player. If the RED player "passes", we move to Stage
4. At Stage 4, the pool of points doubles to 32. Here, if the BLUE player "takes" the player
must decide how to divide the 32 points between himself and the RED player. If the BLUE
player "passes", the game ends with both players receiving 0 points.
Once the game reaches Stage 4, or a player "takes", subjects are awarded the points they earn for
that round, and they move to the next round. In the next round they will play the same game, but
they will be paired with a new player. Again, you will never play another subject more than
once. We will continue this procedure for 10 rounds. Since we have two groups of 10 subjects
and members of a group do not play against each other, none of your pair members have played
against each other before.
In each round, to save time, you are asked to indicate what you would do if you choose "pass" in
earlier stages of the game. For example, if a RED player chooses "pass" in stage 1, we will ask
the player what she would do in stage 3. Similarly, if a BLUE player chooses "pass" in stage 2
we will ask what they would do in stage 4. Note that the game may actually end earlier so your
choice may be immaterial. For example, if a RED player chooses to "pass" in stage 1, and his
BLUE pair member chooses to "take" in stage 2, then the choice of the RED player in stage 3 is
meaningless. The game has ended in stage 2. We ask you to tell us your future choices to save
time in passing messages back and forth. After each round we will tell you your payoff for that
round, and the choice of your pair member.
Payoffs
Your dollar earnings for the experiment are determined as follows. First, we will sum up your
point earnings over the 10 rounds. Then we will multiply this sum by $0.10. We will pay you
this amount when you leave the experiment. Note the more points you earn, the more money
you will receive.
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Figure 1: The Trust Building Game
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pass (x)

Red
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[4a,4(1-a)]
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[8(1-b),8b]
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pass (z)

take
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[16c,16(1-c)]

pass
[0,0]

take

Blue
[32(1-d),32d]

Figure 2: Descriptive Statistics of Players’ Choice
(pooled across 13 experimental sessions and 10 rounds)
Red

Blue
1178 (72.3%)

452 (27.7%)

a = 0.9645

Red
662 (40.6%)

968 (59.4%)

b = 0.9520

Blue
240 (20.4%)

938 (79.6%)

c = 0.9378

2 (0.3%)

660 (99.7%)

d = 0.7753

[0,0]

Figure 3: Calculation of Fitness (Expected Payoff) of Trust
(For Singaporean Experiment in Period 1)
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Blue
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b=0.8838

Blue
28.9%
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RED
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0%
[0,0]

100%

Blue
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Figure 4: Descriptive Statistics of Players’ Choice in the
High-stake Games
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Blue
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c = 0.8492

Blue
3 (1.1%)

280 (98.9%)

d = 0.6400

[0,0]

Figure 5: Descriptive Statistics of Players’ Choice
(Sequential Exchange Protocol)
Red

Blue
138 (69.0%)

62 (31.0%)

a = 0.9756

Red
53 (38.4%)

85 (61.6%)

b = 0.9741
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14 (26.9%)
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Table 1: Percentages of Subjects Showing Trust in Stage 1 and Trustworthy Behavior in Stage 2

Mean Proportion of Trust in Stage 1
95% Confidence Interval
Mean Proportion of Trustworthiness in Stage 2
95% Confidence Interval

China
73.3%
[71.7%, 74.9%]
96.04%
[93.47%, 96.67%]

Country
Singapore
73.0%
[71.3%, 74.7%]
96.44%
[95.16, 97.71%]

USA
69.8%
[68.0%, 71.7%]
95.06%
[93.47%, 96.66%]

Table 2a: A Test of Trustworthiness (Percentages of Property Rights Claimed)

Decision Stages
Country
China
Mean Proportion
95% Confidence Interval
Singapore
Mean Proportion
95% Confidence Interval
USA
Mean Proportion
95% Confidence Interval

1

2

3

4

-

96.04%
[93.47%, 96.67%]

91.77%
[89.29%, 93.06%]

79.17%
[76.44%, 81.91%]

-

96.44%
[95.16, 97.71%]

96.39%
[95.18%, 97.62%]

79.30%
[76.07%, 82.52%]

-

95.06%
[93.47%, 96.66%]

93.71%
[92.10%, 95.33%]

73.73%
[70.45%, 77.01%]

Table 2b: A Test of Trusting Behavior (% of Subjects who pass at each stage)

Country
China
Mean Percentages
95% Confidence Interval
Singapore
Mean Percentages
95% Confidence Interval
USA
Mean Percentages
95% Confidence Interval

1

Decision Stages
2

3

4

73.3%
48.3%
[71.7%, 74.9%] [46.3%, 50.3%]

25.8%
[24.0%, 27.6%]

-

73.0%
34.2%
[71.3%, 74.7%] [30.9%, 37.5%]

20.2%
[18.6%, 21.8%]

-

69.8%
38.2%
[68.0%, 71.7%] [36.1%, 40.3%]

13.8%
[12.6%, 15.0%]

-

Table 3: Relative Fitness Of Different Trusting Behavior Paths Based On Observed Choices
Singapore
RED
T
PT
PP

1
4.00
7.76
5.20

2
4.00
7.21
4.61

3
4.00
7.87
4.23

4
4.00
5.88
2.21

5
4.00
5.06
2.37

6
4.00
4.66
1.97

7
4.00
5.17
1.50

8
4.00
3.67
0.69

9
4.00
3.71
0.84

10
4.00
5.53
0.88

BLUE
T
PT

5.75
10.12

6.04
6.80

6.79
10.14

6.49
5.99

6.19
9.51

6.34
7.76

5.28
4.19

5.58
3.79

4.70
2.68

5.28
4.00

USA
RED
T
PT
PP

1
4.00
9.38
6.00

2
4.00
8.27
5.42

3
4.00
7.51
4.35

4
4.00
6.67
4.49

5
4.00
8.81
4.94

6
4.00
5.28
2.05

7
4.00
4.90
2.15

8
4.00
4.02
2.16

9
4.00
4.38
2.23

10
4.00
4.39
1.00

BLUE
T
PT

6.51
7.84

5.58
7.31

6.41
8.06

6.45
4.80

5.98
3.26

6.43
4.37

4.99
3.68

4.71
3.62

4.50
2.71

4.71
3.37

China
RED
T
PT
PP

1
4.00
7.43
4.17

2
4.00
7.38
4.34

3
4.00
10.45
5.60

4
4.00
6.06
3.66

5
4.00
7.78
3.30

6
4.00
7.58
2.78

7
4.00
8.65
3.32

8
4.00
7.69
3.04

9
4.00
8.80
2.77

10
4.00
8.00
1.71

BLUE
T
PT

5.79
9.16

6.32
9.88

5.36
10.11

6.52
9.27

6.33
9.64

6.05
7.06

6.01
8.12

5.79
9.10

5.58
8.69

5.76
10.00

Table 4: A Test of Evolutionary Trust Building Paths Acorss Sub-populations
RED
α
β
Adj. R-Sq

Estimate t-statistic p-value
0.5261
5.83
0.0001
0.2794
8.01
0.0001
0.8156

BLUE
α
β
Adj. R-Sq

Estimate t-statistic p-value
0.8208
6.07
0.0001
-0.0591
-0.32
0.7489
0.2136

